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Abstract 
This study determines the factors that influenced contract choice, labour demand and examines the existence of 
labour hoarding practice in Western region of Kenya. Data from Egerton University’s Tegemeo Institute of 
Agricultural Policy and Development was used for the analysis.. A two step Heckman model was employed to 
estimate the extent of engagement in daily and semi-permanent contracts conditional on choice of contract. 
Results from the study show that casual and semi-permanent contracts are substitutes.  Family labour negatively 
influences engagement in daily and semi-permanent contracts hence it is a substitute to the two forms of the 
contracts. Increase in wages paid to casual contracts is negative and significant to the extent of daily contract 
engagement but positive and significant to semi-permanent contracts supporting the substitutability of daily 
contracts for semi-permanent contracts. Methods and costs of farm preparation are significant in influencing the 
choice and demand for any type of contracts. The proxy variable for hoarding costs is significant and positive 
indicating that there are hoarding costs incurred in the maintaining a steady pool of labour within the farm. From 
the results the relatively asset poor farmers engage in the wage high daily contracts to avoid incurring hoarding 
costs as indicated by the dummy denoting poverty level. However, to avoid uncertainty during peak periods semi-
permanent contracts are highly employed by the asset poor farmers. From the results, farmers willing to minimize 
hoarding costs may find themselves substituting family labour for daily contracts or in absence of family labour, 
semi-permanent contracts for daily contracts.  
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Introduction 
It is estimated that 80% of the Kenyan population is 
rural based and derive their livelihoods largely from 
exploitation of agriculture through crop and livestock 
production and exploitation of forest and natural 
resources (Ministry of Agriculture, 2006). Out of this 
population 80 percent thrive as smallholders who 
contribute 25.5 percent of the agricultural GDP and 
account for the bulk of rural agricultural employment 
and hence key to rural economic growth. The sector’s 
economic importance has been declining over the 
period of economic reforms prompting increasing 
unemployment which reached an estimated 14% by 
2002 (CBS, 2002) and grossly contributing to the ever 
increasing rural poverty.  
The rise in unemployment and rural poverty in recent 
years in Kenya has renewed interest in the interaction 
between labor market conditions and earnings. By far 
the largest costs incurred by agricultural undertaking 
are labor costs. Given the magnitude of labor costs, 
their impact on profits is critical, and relatively small  
changes either in the size or in the compensation of the 
labor force can result in a relatively large effect on 
profit. The demand for hired labor increases with 
technological advances such as the use of high-
yielding seed varieties or land improvement factors but 
may decline with increased mechanization.  
The premise of this study is entrenched within the 
assumptions that agriculture is the key to the rural 
economic growth as envisioned in the Economic 
Recovery Strategy, that smallholders constrained by 
the availability of productive resources best allocate 
them to maximize farm returns and hoard labour 
during slack periods to reduce resource uncertainty 
during peak periods. The factors that leads to choice of 
a specific labour contract in rural agricultural 
economies are yet unknown in the empirical literature. 
It is presuppose that technological advancement lead 
to complementary or substitution relationships 
between methods of land preparation, contract choice 
and labour demand in the rural areas. It is also 
plausible and appealing to assume that there exists 
equilibrium between labour supply and demand.   Rural Household Labour Demand 
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Theoretical Framework 
We base our assumptions on the efficiency wage 
theory and proceed to build our case model in line 
with the theory on the basis of Shapiro and Stiglitz 
(1984) for this empirical regularity. Employers, who 
can imperfectly monitor workers’ productivity, will 
offer a wage that will discourage workers from 
shirking (avoidance). Because the expected penalty for 
shirking, when detected, is greater when it becomes 
harder to find a job, firms can offer a lower wage 
premium during times of high unemployment. This 
shirking model has, as noted by (Card 1995), various 
advantages over the two other models. Firstly, it 
suggests that a short-run inverse correlation between 
wages and unemployment rates is not inconsistent with 
a long-run positive cross-sectional association between 
expected regional wages and unemployment rates, as 
suggested by Harris and Todaro (1970). An additional 
advantage of this theory is that it leads to the testable 
hypothesis that a group-specific unemployment rate 
should be a better predictor of group-specific wages 
than the average regional unemployment rate. This 
hypothesis can be tested to the extent that group-
specific regional unemployment rates can be observed. 
Thirdly, since the shirking model is likely to be more 
relevant in relatively non-unionised economies, the 
model predicts that a decline in unionisation should 
lead to a more elastic wage curve.  
Labour demand and characterization of hoarding 
costs 
The demand for labour in the rural areas follows the 
seasonal agricultural production. Assuming that the 
farmers are risk neutral in the sense that they organize 
their production using labour and land and also that the 
production of a particular crop follows two seasons, a 
slack (t=0) and a peak (t=1) period, C0 and C1 define 
the casual labour demand in the respective periods R is 
the regular labour hired at the beginning of the slack 
period. All the labour inputs are measured in labour 
hours (no of workers), then the production structure 
during the slack period is defined two stage similar to 
Pal (2002) as follows, 
) , , , ( 0 0 θ K R C y Y =   
Where Y0 is the output during the slack period, K is 
the level of farmers land holding and θ  is an 
uncertain random variable. The output in the slack 
period is used as an input in the peak period 
production such that the production structure during 
the peak period is defined by, 
) , , , , ( 1 0 1 θ K R C Y y Y =  
The production structure is assumed to be concave and 
twice differentiable such that the first and second 
derivatives are positive and negative respectively. 
Assuming that the farmers maximise their profits 
through maximising output, then there exists a dual 
cost minimisation objective underlying the primal 
production structure. Two cases, following the duality 
assumption are considered to explicitly elicit the issue 
of production cost minimization through minimization 
of transaction costs which are components of the cost 
structure.  
Consider the first case in which the revenue of the 
regular worker when working in his small plot is 
higher than the daily regular wage. The workers 
production function in his own farm plot is defined 
by, ) , , ( θ k l y Y h h =  where l is the labour at his 
disposal particularly household labour, k the size of the 
farm plots. The revenue from his farm is what he 
looses by engaging in regular contract. In order for the 
farmer to maintain the pool of regular labour, then s/he 
should compensate for the revenue lost by the regular 
worker. Taking  y φ to be the hoarding costs incurred 
due to the workers forgone costs then the farmers total 
costs of production can be expressed as follows 
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1  defines C1 (casual labour demand in 
peak period), rev y is the revenue forgone by the regular 
worker, F is the total fixed costs and  r w are the wages 
paid to regular workers.  
  The farmer is assumed to minimise costs with 
respect to amount of regular labour hired as follows 
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Rearranging this then it is evident that the marginal 
hoarding costs equal the difference between the 
revenue forgone and daily regular wages 
In the second case, consider a situation in which the 
casual wages  c w  are higher than the regular wages r w   Gathungu, and Musyoka  
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and that the worker owns no significant production 
plot, there is a hoarding cost associated with 
maintaining of the pool of regular labour. This is 
because if there is a high probability  c p  of securing a 
casual job then the regular workers will shift from 
their regular contracts to casual contracts. Taking 
hoarding costs incurred by the farmer due to higher 
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The farm firm minimises the costs with respect to the 
pool of regular labour as 
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Rearranging the above derivative clarifies that the 
marginal hoarding costs are equal to the difference 
between the casual and regular wages. 
  From the above two cases, hoarding costs are 
hypothesised to behave as follows; 















 meaning that hoarding cost increase with 
the increase in the farm revenue forgone by the 
worker. An underlying implication is that as the 
workers land holding and the labour at his disposal 
increases, the farmers cost of maintaining labour pool 
(hoarding costs) also increases. 
  From the second case, hoarding costs are 
defined as 
















, hence as the casual wages increase in the 
labour market then the farmers cost of maintaining the 
pool of regular labour increases. 
Model specification and estimation procedure 
As aforementioned efficiency wage theory proposes a 
wage equal to the opportunity cost to reduce shirking. 
This is consistent with the transaction costs hypothesis 
that as the revenue forgone increases, hoarding costs 
increases and consequently the wages to labour. These 
consequently influence the demand for labour 
conditional on the decision to employ. This general 
hypothesis sets the study directly to its premise of 
identifying and empirically assessing the factors 
influencing contract choice and rural labour demand. 
To investigate choice of contract and the demand for 
labour, a multivariate model is adopted. The decision 
on how much to hire in any contract type is 
conditional on whether to hire any labour in any 
contract this raises the need for joint determination of 
the factors influencing choice of contract and labour 
demand and the significance of factors depicting 
hoarding costs. If μ is the contract type, then it is 
observable only when a farmer has chosen a contract 
or not. The underlying continuous variable
* μ  is a 
function to a set of conditioning factors. 
Therefore, 
, 1 = μ     If    0
* > μ ,  
         Otherwise 
    =0, if    0
* ≤ μ  
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Where, ρ F , is a multivariate correlation 
coefficient and reduces to univariate logit or probit 
when there are only two alternatives. The choice of 
logit or probit is depended on the assumption of the 
random term distribution.  i X , denote the factors that 
influence contract choice. The amount of labour in any 
form of contract chosen is conditional on whether the 
choice of contract has been made. Let the demand for 
labour which is the dependant variable in the second 
stage of the estimation is denoted by DLab 0 ≥   
which is observable only if  1 = μ  and is equal to a 
latent variable, 
* Z   then 
i i i W Z ν θ α + Φ + =
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Where, i W  is a vector of variables that influence 
labour demand and Φ  is an instrumental variable 
(This is normally an Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) 
estimated as the ratio of normal probability density 
function to the cumulative density function. These are 
estimated from the parameters of the first probit 
equation and used in the second stage OLS estimation 
)for bias correction estimated from the first probit 
equation. A two-step Heckman framework is used in 
this analysis. The technique involves estimation of the 
probit and then using the probit parameters to estimate 
the OLS model. In this case a normal distribution of 
the random term is assumed hence a probit model for 
the contract choice equation 1. The labour demand 
equation (equation 2) is corrected for selection bias by 
incorporating an instrumental variable estimated from 
the parameters of the first probit equation (equation 1). 
The error terms of the two equations are here assumed 
to be jointly normally distributed at zero mean and 
constant variances 
2
ε σ  and
2
ν σ  and correlation 
coefficientρ . This model operates on the premise that 
the rural farmer has a supply of labor from the 
household. Since the farmer has a fixed size of land 
and operates in a mixed farming system, he will have 
to maintain a minimum number of workers 
irrespective of the season.  During the peak season 
however, the farmer will have to acquire extra help, 
which comes in the form of casual. At the same time 
some farm enterprises require constant labor 
throughout the agricultural year. This ‘permanent’ 
labor exists to maintain some of those enterprises, 
which may not be productive for a certain period but 
still, needs to be looked after. The farmer has to decide 
on the opportunity cost of maintaining a ‘permanent’ 
employee and using the household labor for this 
purpose. The farmer therefore uses three forms of 
labor contracts i.e. regular or permanent, casual or 
household labor, in varying proportions. 
Empirical model 
The dependent variable in the first equations for each 
contract are dummy variables, while the selection 
equations dependent variables are continuous. The 
inclusion of the independent variables was not without 
apriori theoretical assumptions. The inclusion of farm 
size was justifiable as the proxy variable for labour 
hoarding cost. The variable has previously been used 
as a proxy by Pal (1999 and 2002). It is justified under 
the fact that, larger farms have higher and steadier 
demand for labour that smaller farms (Pal, 1999). 
Hired daily contract wage was included to bring in the 
aspect of labour contract segmentation under the 
market. The poverty variable (pov) takes a value of 
0=poor for those with income below 10,000 Ksh 
monthly and 1=rich for those above 10,000 as per the 
classification highlighted in CBS, 2004. It is 
hypothesized that resource endowment influences the 
form of contract engagement. Other variables such as 
LNMANACR, LNTRACR and LNOXACRE are 
included to elicit the effects of farm husbandry 
practices that may warrant hoarding of labour within 
the farm. An efficient method of land preparation is 
assumed to reduce the engagement in any of the 
contracts.  
This assumption holds since most of the labour hired 
is used for weeding. While tractor land preparation 
may be efficient in reducing the growth rate of weeds, 
oxen land preparation may be less efficient with 
manual preparation of land being even less efficient. 
The inclusion of the cost (expenditures) of these 
methods is justifiable although one may expect 
multicolinearity with their respective area covered. 
Multicolinearity doesn’t arise in this case because of 
market imperfections and the terrain of land which 
guarantee different per acre preparation prices between 
and within household farms respectively 
Results and Discussion 
Results from the analysis (Annex 1) indicate that both 
casual (lndhire) and semi-permanent (lnco) contracts 
are substitutes. Family labour is a substitute to both 
contracts also. This implies that as farmer engages 
more family labour (lnfaml) the less the contractual 
engagement while engagement in any of the contracts 
diminish the resources and hence the probability of 
engaging in the alternative contractual form. Daily 
wage (lndwage) increases leads to decline in 
engagement in casual contracts however, this leads to 
more engagement in the semi-permanent contracts. As 
wages paid to casual contracts increases, farmers tend 
to engage in the less costly and more reliable semi-
permanent contracts as a way of minimizing labour 
costs.  
This raises the pertinent issue of whether farmers 
should incur hoarding costs or pay higher to the casual 
workers during the peak period. Normally casual 
contracts attract higher daily wages relative to the 
semi-permanent contracts. The proxy variable (area of 
farm in acres-lnacres) for hoarding costs is positive  Gathungu, and Musyoka  
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and significant in both contract forms implying that 
hoarding costs increase as the size of land cultivated 
increases. Further, as casual daily wage increases, 
hoarding costs increases due to the shifts from casual 
engagement to the semi-permanent contracts  
The poverty dummy (pov, taking values of 0, for the 
poor and 1 for the rich) is significant in semi-
permanent contracts. While the asset poor farmers just 
contemplate on engaging in casual contracts, it is the 
relatively well endowed who go ahead and engage in 
these casual contracts. On the other hand, results hold 
to the conventional wisdom that, it is the relatively 
well endowed farmers who would engage in semi-
permanent contracts as they have the capacity to incur 
labour hoarding costs. This gives the well endowed 
head start in production decisions relative to the less 
endowed hence the ever increasing inequity in rural 
areas.  
Other factors that influence contractual engagement 
include the level of technological advancement 
especially in land preparation which is key husbandry 
practice in rural agricultural production. While 
agriculture is labour intensive in developing countries, 
capital augmented technologies lead to increased 
efficiency in production and may also lead to reduced 
labour demand and consequently increasing rural 
unemployment. Policies that enhance redistribution are 
in this case appropriate to equitably distribute the 
margins of production as technology advances to the 
marginal costs of unemployment. 
There is lack of empirical literature on hoarding costs 
and poverty hence no meaningful comparative analysis  
that could be done. 
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Casual Contracts  Semi-permanent Contracts  
Number of observations 327      327 
Wald Chi2(21)=93.71      236.12 
Prob >chi2=0.0000      0.0000 
uncensored observations 118      162 
Demand for Casual contracts    Demand for semi permanent contracts 
 Coef.  P>|z|    Coef.  P>|z| 
lndwage   -0.5662**  0.0490  Lndwage  0.0061  0.9150 
lnacres   0.5159**  0.0170  Lnacres  0.9743***  0.0000 
lnmanacr   -0.1640  0.1400  Lnmanacr  0.0234  0.8170 
lntracr -0.4832**  0.0490  lntracr    0.3196*  0.0980 
lnoxacre 0.0280  0.8600  Lnoxacre  -0.1634  0.2210 
lnoxco -0.0354  0.2000  Lnoxco  0.0273  0.2680 
Lnotraco 0.0510  0.1880  Lnotraco  -0.0014  0.9650 
Lnmanuco 0.0528  0.3610  Lnmanuco  0.0586  0.2860 
lnfamla   -0.1608  0.1340  Lnfamla  -0.1138  0.2540 
lnco   -0.0667  0.1100  Lndahire  -0.0024  0.9790 
pov 0.1096  0.5770  pov    0.4336**  0.0350 
cons 5.4612***  0.0000  cons    6.3556***  0.0000 
Choice of casual contracts    Choice for semi permanent contracts 
 Coef.  P>|z|    Coef.  P>|z| 
Lnacres 0.3081*  0.0760  lnacres    0.5505***  0.0020 
Lnmanacr -0.0468 0.5940  Lnmanacr  -0.1751**  0.0420 
lntracr   0.5262**  0.0200  Lntracr  -0.2197  0.2750 
Lnoxacre -0.0016  0.9910  Lnoxacre  -0.1418  0.3620 
Lnoxco 0.0027  0.9090  Lnoxco  0.0227  0.3420 
Lnotraco -0.0593  0.1030  Lnotraco  0.1010***  0.0020 
Lnmanuco 0.1365***  0.0000  Lnmanuco  0.2541***  0.0000 
Lnfamla -0.2615**  0.0150  Lnfamla  -0.4380***  0.0000 
Lnco 0.0633**  0.0150  Lndahire  0.0791  0.3820 
pov -0.0191  0.9210  pov  0.4307**  0.0270 
cons 0.3858  0.5430  cons  1.3153*  0.0610 
lambda   -0.7138  0.2520  lambda   0.0406  0.9290 
Rho -0.7185    rho  |  0.0412   
Sigma   0.9935    sigma |  0.9862   